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Postponement and reinstatement of trustee sales:  
Hicks v E.T. Legg,. 2001 
Roger Bernhardt 
 
Hicks v E.T. Legg & Assocs. (2001) 89 CA4th 496, 108 CR2d 10  
Under CC §2924c(e), trustors on deeds of trust havethe right to reinstate a defaulted loan until 
five business days before the date set for the forecl sure sale. If the sale is postponed for more 
than five business days, the right of reinstatement is revived as of the date of the postponement 
and continues until five business days before the new sale date declared at the postponement.  
In 1991, Hicks borrowed $935,000, encumbering his property with a deed of trust in favor of 
the lender. Some years later, Hicks defaulted on the loan, the trustee recorded a notice of trustee 
sale, and Hicks filed a petition under Chapter 11. On June 27, the bankruptcy court lifted the 
automatic stay, but ordered that the foreclosure sal  be delayed until July 28 to permit Hicks “a 
small window of time” to reinstate the loan. On July 24, Hicks obtained a temporary restraining 
order prohibiting the foreclosure sale, but failed to notify the lender’s successor (Legg) of the ex 
parte TRO hearing, as required by local court rule. The trustee began postponing the trustee sales 
for successive periods of five days or less. Between August and December, the sale was 
postponed 25 times. During that period, Hicks sought to pay the sum owed and reinstate the loan 
several times, but Legg rejected the offers, on the ground the reinstatement period had expired. 
The bankruptcy court dissolved the TRO (finding it improperly granted) and, on December 4, 
Legg acquired the property at the trustee sale. Hicks, pursuing the suit to set aside the foreclosure 
sale, argued that (1) repeated postponements of the foreclosure sale for periods of five days or 
less were prohibited as a matter of law by the forecl sure statutes; and (2) Legg’s conduct was a 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The jury found for Legg. 
The court of appeal affirmed. The court took note of CC §2924g(d), which mandates a 
minimum seven-day period between the expiration or termination of an injunction, restraining 
order, or stay (that requires postponement of the sal ) and the trustee sale. Hicks argued that the 
purpose of this minimum seven-day wait was to permit einstatement. The court, however, held 
that the purpose of the seven-day waiting period of CC §2924g is “wholly unrelated” to the right 
of reinstatement, and would not “attribute to the Legislature an intent to prohibit, as a matter of 
law, the postponement of a foreclosure sale for successive periods of five or fewer business days 
during the period a sale is precluded by an injunctio  or bankruptcy stay.” 89 CA4th at 508. 
The court also noted CC §2924g(c)(1), which requires a new notice of sale—and a new 
reinstatement period—after three postponements at the beneficiary’s request. Under that statute, 
however, postponements due to court orders, stays, or by mutual agreement of the beneficiary 
and trustors are not counted as postponements for the purpose of determining whether a new 
notice of sale is required. 
Finally, the court of appeal concluded that the jury did not abuse its discretion in deciding that 
Legg did not violate the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Alluding to Hicks’s 
surreptitious obtaining of the TRO, the court observed that Hicks could not thereafter 
“reasonably expect a revival of the reinstatement priod to be a benefit of the contract.”  
THE EDITOR’S TAKE: I hope the following helps as a brief summary of what CC 
§§2924c(e), 2924g(c), and 2924g(d) say about lenders’ postponements of trustee sales and 
borrowers’ rights to loan reinstatement: 
1. For the first three-month period following a notice of default, and for the first 15 days of the 
20-day period following the notice of sale, there is a right of reinstatement, i.e., a right to have 
the trustee sale cancelled by paying all the arrearages without having to pay the entire debt.  
2. During the final five business days before the scheduled sale, there is no right of 
reinstatement. There is only the right of redemption, .e., the right to pay the entire debt before 
the hammer falls.  
3. A sale date can be rescheduled either by a new notice of sale, or by a notice of 
postponement. While a new notice of sale must comply with all the formalities of the original 
notice of sale, the notice of postponement is accomplished by a making a “public statement” at 
the time and place of the original sale.  
4. A new notice of sale also carries with it a new five-day reinstatement right; whereas a notice 
of postponement does not revive the right of reinstatement unless the new date is more than five 
days in the future. (Thus, a four-day postponement during the final five-day period does not 
revive the right of reinstatement.) 
5. But, the beneficiary can make only three notices of postponement, after which the 
beneficiary must send out a new notice of sale, which revives a right of reinstatement. (So a 
beneficiary seeking to avoid that revival should (a) postpone rather than renotice a sale, (b) set 
each new date less than five days hence, and (c) not postpone more than three times.)  
6. The three-postponement limit does not apply to postponements made while federal or state 
stays or injunctions are in effect. Such postponements can be made as often as necessary, without 
thereby reviving the right to reinstate. (This makes it rather silly to limit such postponements to 
four-day periods, but that is probably what the code sections require.)  
7. There must be a seven-day wait before going to sale after the stay or injunction has been 
lifted. According to this decision, however, that does not mean that the postponements necessary 
to get through that week have to be for seven-day periods; two four-day postponements are 
permissible (assuming that the three-postponement quota has not been used up), and will keep 
reinstatement rights from reviving.  
8. But, the beneficiary should not delay furnishing the trustor with a statement of the amount 
necessary for reinstatement until the final five-day period has arrived. He got away with that here 
only because the trustors’ mala fides seemed to exceed his own. —Roger Bernhardt 
 
